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The proposed Uniform Consumer Credit Code (UCCC) devel-
oped by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws (NCCUSL) is intended to remedy many of the imper-
fections that have been accumulating in the consumer credit market
in the last sixty years. These impediments to the free flow of credit
result from a variety of legal fictions that were initially developed
to circumvent outmoded usury laws, and to bypass the doctrine of
productive credit-the tradition of not extending consumer credit;
unfortunately, in the course of time these fictions create new prob-
lems often as difficult as the initial problems that they were de-
signed to circumvent. The Code represents the first major attempt
to deal directly with both the legal and economic dimensions of
consumer credit regulation. Thus, the Code attempts to define the
legal relationship-the rights and remedies of the individual bor-
rower and creditor-in a particular transaction and also to define
new "ground rules" for all consumer credit markets. Accordingly,
to evaluate the impact of the Code on the consumer we must analyze
the Code in its entirety; we must analyze the provisions regulating
specific transactions, and the new ground rules-the general provi-
sions outlining the conditions of entry, the supply and availability
of credit, and the character of the marketplace.
The theory of the Uniform Code is that legislation enabling cred-
itors to compete more effectively, and permitting new sources of
supply to enter the market will serve the consumer interest effec-
tively and equitably and also help to achieve a lower cost of credit.
Those who support the Code contend that the legislation defining
the character of the market, and the regulations defining the con-
ditions under which lenders may compete are the powerful, per-
vasive, and ultimately dominant market forces which must be har-
nessed by those who seek to protect the consumer interest. An
evaluation of the effect of the Code on the consumer interest re-
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quires, therefore, an analysis of its effect on the supply and avail-
ability of credit, on the demand for consumer credit, on the extent
to which lenders can compete in legally fragmented markets, and on
the cost of installment credit. Such an analysis is complex. It re-
quires a theory of segmented credit markets, an analysis of the
relation between legal ceiling rates and actual market rates, and a
diagnosis of the strategies needed to effect change; it also requires
an examination of the interaction between the "rules of the game"
as they are defined in the Code for the market as a whole, and the
economic realities that are likely to emerge in the numerous indi-
vidual transactions that will take place in the marketplace.
The Code also incorporates some new regulations concerning
rights and obligations of the individual borrowers and creditors.
The drafters have been innovative in creating a regulatory scheme
that is more general than existing legislation in its application and
is therefore less likely to be frustrated by changes in the forms in
which abusive credit practices may take place in the future. In
addition, the Code attempts to facilitate the consumer's ability to
assert his own rights as well as his ability to respond to creditor's
claims against him. These provisions must, however, be assessed,
not in relation to the pre-Code market, but in relation to the market
forces that the Code seeks to stimulate.
The proponents of the Code have anticipated that some will
disagree with the underlying theory of a uniform Code and others
will disagree with the manner in which this policy is implemented
in the Code. Paradoxically, criticism of the Code often focuses on
its handling, or apparent oversight, of specific credit practices as
though the Code were simply an amalgam of legislation designed to
correct a set of immediate problems arising from particular, and
presumably unrelated, credit abuses. Such criticism overlooks the
economic rationale of the Code. The purpose of this paper is to dis-
cuss the rationale of the Code, the extent to which the provisions in
the Code reflect the underlying analytical framework, and to evalu-
ate these provisions in relation to the kind of market imperfections,
and other impediments to the free flow of credit, that they are de-
signed to remove.
I. STIMULATING CREDITOR COMPETITION
The primary strategy adopted by the Code to stimulate creditor
competition is similar regulatory treatment of all creditors engaging
in the extension of consumer credit. Particular emphasis is placed
upon elimination of differential treatment of creditors with respect
to entry requirements and rate ceilings.
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A. PE-CODE LEGISLATION
In every state that has not enacted the Code,1 many separate
pieces of legislation deal with matters now covered by the Code.
Under these statutory schemes, different regulatory treatment is
often accorded functionally similar credit extensions. Present statu-
tory fragmentation originated with the Uniform Small Loan Act
in which only those lenders who were licensed under the Act were
permitted to make loans at the high rates authorized. Thereafter, a
series of installment loan statutes were enacted over the years, each
permitting a particular class of creditor to make loans at rates in
excess of the maximums set forth in the general interest and usury
statutes. Instead of expanding the categories of creditors eligible
to make loans under the small loan act or, alternatively, under one
general installment loan law, the enabling statutes set forth differ-
ent regulatory treatment for different lenders. In addition, sales
credit extended through the seller of goods or services was not, until
relatively recently, subject to finance charge ceilings or to any
other special restrictions. Moreover, when sales credit was finally
regulated, the statutes often differentiated among sellers dealing
with different types of commodities or different arrangements. 2
The effect on the market of this statutory fragmentation, al-
though it may vary from state to state, should not be underesti-
mated. Any given class of creditors is for all practical purposes
unable to compete for consumer credit extensions not specifically
contemplated in the statute to which that class is subject. To cite
New York for example, a given credit transaction may come under
nine different statutes which, in turn, may specify as many as four-
teen different rate ceilings, different loan maxima, disclosure re-
quirements, penalties, and other criteria.3 This fragmented legal
I To date the Code has been enacted in only two states: Oklahoma and
Utah. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 14A, §§ 1 to 9 (Supp. 1969); UTAH CODE
ANN. §§ 70B-1-101 to 70B-9-103 (Supp. 1969). For a discussion of the
pre-Code legal fragmentation see B. CURRAN, TRENDS IN CoNsuMER
CREDIT LEGISLATION (1965); Fand, Competition and Regulation in the
Consumer Credit Markets, 20 PERSONAL FINANCE LAw 18 (1965).
2 For example, retail installment sales contracts for motor vehicles
versus contracts for other goods; revolving credit. See the discussion
of fragmented laws and segmented markets in D. Fand & R. Forbes,
Supply Condtions in Consumer Credit Markets, in PAPERS IN QUAN-
TITATVE EcoNoics (1968).
3 In New York state there are nine different statutes regulating, among
others, installment loans by commercial and industrial banks; bank
check credit plans; retail revolving charge accounts; motor vehicle
installment sales financing; installment sales financing of other goods
and services; loans by consumer finance companies; and other credit
unions. See Curran, Legislative Controls as a Response to Consumer-
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framework encourages segmentation of the consumer credit market.
In effect, one market is broken up (legally) into fourteen possible
markets.
There are numerous examples of how statutory fragmentation
fosters division of the consumer credit market among different
classes of creditors. Commercial banks and credit unions do not
deal directly with second mortgage real estate financing. Vendors
and retailers do not make cash loans. Finance companies do not
extend revolving credit. In addition, the existence of segmented
and non-competing submarkets is further indicated by empirical
studies on finance rates which show that the rates charged to a
given consumer for a credit extension of given characteristics may
vary considerably.4 These studies suggest that it may be desirable
to remove restrictions resulting from fragmented laws, and to bring
in additional creditors and additional sources of credit. Competition
among creditors, no longer restricted to legally segmented sub-
markets, may prove helpful in lowering the cost of consumer credit.
B. THE CODE PROVISIONS
Subject to certain exceptions, the Code covers all consumer
(personal and non-commercial) credit extensions of less than
twenty-five thousand dollars which are repayable in installments
or for which a credit charge is made.5 The Code regulates not only
Credit Problems, 8 B.C. IND. & COm. L. REV. 409 (1967); Fand, Com-
ments on the Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 23 JOURNAL OF FINANCE
81 (1968).
4 Schweiger & McGee, Chicago Banking, 34 JOURNAL or BusNEss 259,
261 (1961); Jung, Charges for Appliance and Automobile Installment
Credit in Major Cities, 35 JOURNAL or BusiNEss 386-91 (1962); R.
Shay, New Automobile Finance Rates, NATIONAL BUREAU OF EcONOMIc
REsEARCH 1924-62 (1963); JUNG, Commercial Bank Charges in New
York and Ontario, 2 NATIONAL BAN=G REV. 397-401 (1965). For an
analysis of these findings see the discussion of Evidence on Market
Imperfections in D. FAND, SAVINGS INTERMEDIARIES AND CONSUMER
CREDIT MARKETS (1970) [hereinafter cited as FAND].
5 UCCC §§ 2.104, 3.104. Credit sales of an interest in land are exempted
from the Code if the finance charge is 10% or less per annum. Where
the rate for such a transaction is greater than 10% the Code provi-
sions apply even though the amount financed exceeds $25,000. A credit
sale of an interest in land, otherwise exempt, is subject, however,
to Code disclosure provisions and a provision relating to rescission by
the buyer. The situation with loans secured by an interest in land is
the same except that the exemption for loans bearing an interest rate
of 10% or less will only apply if the value of the collateral is substan-
tial in relation to the amount of the loan. See also Curran, Adminis-
tration and Enforcement Under the Uniform Consumer Credit Code,
33 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 737 (1968).
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the terms of the arrangements but also creditor practices in the
offering, extension, and collection of credit. In effect, the Code inte-
grates into one document virtually all consumer credit regulation
and, most importantly, reduces legal impediments restricting com-
petition by applying substantially similar treatment to all creditors
and transactions coming within the purview of the Code.
To some degree, the similarity of treatment of vendor and lender
credit is obscured by the fact that the drafters chose to treat loans
and sales credit in separate sections for purposes of disclosure, rate
ceilings, and restrictions on contract terms.6 In addition to the
unnecessary complexity created by this approach, the formal dis-
tinction tends to perpetuate a notion of functional difference that
does not exist for regulatory purposes. In doing so, it may encourage
future differential treatment of credit arrangements or creditors
on this basis. Nevertheless, the Code ultimately must be judged
on its substance and not on form and, even in its present form, the
Code attempts, wherever possible, to regulate consumer credit
from an overall market perspective without creating substantive
segmentation of classes of creditors or arrangements.
With only one significant exception, no license is required under
the Code for a creditor to engage in the business of credit extensions
or collections.7 The only creditors who must obtain a license are
those who wish to charge in excess of eighteen percent per annum
effective rate on consumer loans. Exempted from licensing provi-
sions are institutions otherwise supervised by state administrative
agencies, such as banks and credit unions. The license requirement
applies not only to the lender but to his transferee, if the transferee
is in the business of acquiring such obligations for the purpose of
collection and enforcement as a creditor. It may be inferred from
the provisions of the Code, as well as the official comments, that li-
censes will be issued pro forma except in the case where information
about the applicant indicates he is likely to engage in unscrupulous
or overreaching behavior in the market. The license is a permit to
transact the business of loan extensions and collections where the
credit charge is in excess of eighteen percent; it remains in force
unless and until relinquished by the holder or suspended or revoked
for cause by the issuing agency.8 Loans made by non-licensees at
rates in excess of eighteen percent are unenforceable. 9
6 UCCC §§ 2.101 to 2.605, 3.101 to 3.604.
7 As to licensing, see UCCC §§ 3.201, 3.501, 3.502.
8 UCCC § 3.504.
9 UCCC § 5.502.
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All persons engaging in the business of extension or collection
of consumer credit obligations, regardless of whether they are li-
censed, must register annually with the state consumer credit ad-
ministrator.1 0 The presumption here is that, in a market place so
large and diverse, licensing per se is not likely to check objection-
able behavior and that the more effective strategy is to rely on the
administrator to ferret out, investigate, and deal with noncompliant
behavior. In this case, registration is sufficient to identify and locate
market participants. This rationale for a registration system, if valid,
would seem to be equally applicable to lenders charging in excess of
eighteen percent per annum. The licensing requirement for this
group is a curious and possibly unfortunate retrogression to earlier
theories of consumer credit regulation.
Rate ceilings are the same for all consumer credit transactions
covered by the Code with two important exceptions.' First, a spe-
cial rate applies to revolving credit arrangements made in connec-
tion with a sale.12 Second, although these rate ceilings apply to all
sales credit, they are not applicable to loans unless made by licensed
lenders or state supervised institutions specifically exempted from
licensing.'3 The similarity in rate ceilings is intended to inhibit
market segmentation and, consequently, to increase creditor com-
petition across the board. Moreover, the ceilings established are
relatively high-the theory being that stimulation of creditor com-
petition will tend to reduce going rates below the ceilings. The
important question is whether the removal of legal impediments to
increased competition among creditors will in fact lower the cost
of credit for the consumer.
C. Tim EFFECT ON THE MARKET
The UCCC, if enacted, would, in fact, make it easier for addi-
tional lenders to enter the market. These entry provisions have been
criticized by consumer groups on the grounds that the UCCC:
10 UCCC §§ 6.201 to 6.203.
11 36% per year on unpaid balances of $300 or less; 21% per year on
unpaid balances of more than $300 but not over $1000; 15% per year on
unpaid balances of more than $1,000; 18% per year on unpaid balances
over $1,000. See UCCC §§ 2.201, 3.508.
12 Revolving Sales Credit: 2% per month on basis of (a) average daily
balance, (b) unpaid balance on same day of billing cycle, or (c) the
median amount within a range within which (a) or (b) fall where
(a), (b), or (c) is $500 or less and 1 % per month on excess (50¢
minimum charge per month permitted). UCCC § 2.207.
13 The maximum rate for lenders who are not licensed or do not qualify
as supervised institutions is 18% per annum. UCCC §§ 3.201, 3.501.
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... opens the door to anyone who wants to go into the money-
lending business. No license would be required unless interest rates
charged were higher than 18 percent, and no limit would be placed
on the number of above-18 percent lenders. Retailers could sell on
credit, as they do now, at high legal interest rates without need of
a license-and thus without fear of losing it for misbehavior.14
The implication that ease of entry and fewer restrictions on lend-
ers may be undesirable is neither self-evident nor correct. The condi-
tions of entry in the Code are designed not only to bring additional
lenders into existing markets, but also to facilitate the ability of
present lenders to compete more effectively. This move to widen
the scope of competition among the existing lenders is an important
part of the philosophy underlying the Code.
It is a fact that ceiling rates in the Code would exceed the top
rates now in effect in states such as California and Massachusetts.
And it raises an understandable fear that the rise in ceilings envis-
aged in the Code would not have much effect in increasing the
supply or availability of credit, but would mainly enable the exist-
ing creditors to charge higher rates. This theory, which assumes
that a rise in ceiling rates will generally tend to raise actual rates,
may be plausible and accurate in many instances; but it is much too
simple a theory, in our opinion, to be applied to the Code.
We need to distinguish the following three cases: (1) a lawr
which raises ceiling rates where the effect may well be to raise
actual rates; (2) a law which imposes a uniform set of ceiling rates.
in all states where the effect may be to raise actual rates in
some states and lower them in others; and (3) a law, such as the
Code, which imposes a uniform set of ceilings coupled with entry
conditions designed to facilitate competition by opening up the
market to additional creditors and additional sources of credit. Even
if one assumes that a rise in ceiling rates in one market will always
result in higher actual rates in that market, it does not follow that
the imposition of a set of uniform ceilings will raise rates in all mar-
kets, nor does it follow that the Code will have the effect of raising
rates even in California and Massachusetts. Two implicit, but com-
mon assumptions about interest rates need to be carefully examined.
These are (1) that the legal ceiling rates always end up as the actual
market rates, and (2) that actual market rates can only be lowered
by a reduction in ceilings, and not by strengthening competition
among lenders. In the case of the Code, it is necessary to consider
the effect of a uniform set of ceilings together with the other changes.
affecting entry and the degree to which creditors may compete.
14 A Consumer Credit Code... for Lenders, 34 CONSUMER REPORTS 121,
122 (1969).
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It is often argued that the actual cost of installment credit is
essentially determined by the ceiling rates in the statute, and is
relatively independent of supply and demand. It follows from this
assumption that an increase in the supply of credit may increase
the quantity of outstandings, but will not have much effect on the
cost of credit. On the other hand, if actual credit terms are not
determined by the legally defined ceiling rates (except for particu-
lar categories of marginal credit) and if market rates are, in the
main, responsive to demand and supply conditions, then it is not
legitimate to assume that the cost of credit is independent of avail-
ability.
The assumption (that an increase in supply or availability of
credit may increase outstandings but will not have much effect on
credit terms) leads very naturally to a conclusion that we do not
need to increase either extensions or outstandings. It has been
argued that the installment debt has been expanding at a record
pace under the present rate ceilings and that it would not be socially
desirable to bring in additional sources of supply. This, however,
is a non sequitur. One could equally argue that because imports
have been expanding at a record pace under present tariffs and
quotas are readily available, it would not be desirable (or bene-
ficial to consumers) to lower import tariffs.
An increase in the supply or availability of credit may, in fact,
be most effective in lowering the cost of credit without there being
any necessary increase in either the rate of extensions or in .the
volume of installment debt outstanding. Indeed, an increase in
supply will have the greatest impact in reducing the cost of credit,
precisely when there is no change in outstandings. Accordingly,
those who seek to increase the supply or availability of credit do
not necessarily assume that there is a shortage of credit, or that it
is socially desirable to increase either the rate of credit extensions
or the volume of installment debt outstanding, but rather that this
may be an effective instrument for lowering the rates of installment
credit in particular markets.
We do not wish to suggest that the rate ceilings in the Code
should not be criticized. It may well be that these ceilings, drafted
so as to compromise a host of conflicting viewpoints, may be too
low for marginal borrowers to obtain credit from legitimate lenders,
and may be too high for others. These ceiling rates may not be
the appropriate strategy to implement the NCCUSL philosophy to
set ceilings and not fix rates. Moreover, the formal uniformity of
rates for all types of credit engineered by the draftsmen in the Code
ceiling schedule may be more apparent than real. Different ceilings
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are provided for revolving and non-revolving sales credit, and for
certain non-licensed lenders; a formal distinction between cash loans
and credit sales is still made. These could easily perpetuate, if not
generate, actual segmentation. Moreover, the Code has been criti-
cized because it fails to take adequate account of many of the serious
credit abuses, especially those affecting poor people with low credit
standing, which occur in sales credit more so than in cash loans.
Paradoxically, while the ceiling rate compromises are justified as
a means for effecting uniformity of rate regulation, they may well
incorporate enough latent diversity to effectively stifle the extent
to which the Uniform Code can liberate market forces for service to
the consumer. It is possible that the compromises and fragile dis-
tinctions incorporated into the provisions of the Code will ulti-
mately undermine the progressive NCCUSL philosophy and imagi-
native economics underlying that Code.
II. INCREASING CONSUMER AWARENESS
OF THE FINANCE CHARGE
Disclosure provisions are the primary device used in the Code to
increase the consumer's awareness and knowledgeability about
credit cost.15 The Code opts for the contract document as the pri-
mary instrument for disclosure. Although advertising is subject to
requirements relating to the manner in which finance charges may
be quoted, credit extenders are not obligated to make any statement
about charges in their advertisements. It is only when they choose
to do so that they must conform to the standards of the Code.
Disclosure may serve either to (1) inform the consumer of the
terms prior to his assumption of the obligation or (2) inform the
consumer of the nature of the obligation (including his rights and
duties) that he has already undertaken when he signed the contract.
To the extent the method of disclosure centers on the contract in-
strument, it can hardly assist the consumer in making a circumspect
and informed decision to undertake that particular obligation. The
inclusion of disclosure provisions in the contract instrument tends
to restrict their effectiveness in assisting the consumer in negotiat-
ing or shopping for credit. Even though the consumer is not tech-
nically obligated until he signs the document, he probably already
feels that the commitment is made on both sides by the time the
contract is presented to him for signature. In only two situations-
home solicitation sales and certain credit extensions secured by an
interest in land-is the consumer given the opportunity to change
'5 UCCC §§ 2.301 to 2.313, 3.301 to 3.312. These provisions essentially
incorporate Federal Truth in Lending requirements.
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his mind about a particular obligation after he has signed the con-
tract. 6 Moreover, an individual consumer may be less likely to share
cost information with other consumers-whether fellow workers or
friends-when it is based on his own obligation than if the source
of his information were less personal, for example, if it became
available through advertising copy. Without a requirement that
creditors advertise rates, however, the Code ignores what might
be a substantial instrument for disclosure.
These qualifications aside, what can be expected to be the effect
of pre-contract rate disclosure required by the Code? The emphasis
in the Code is on disclosure of cost as having a shopping function;
it will permit the consumer to compare cost among alternative
credit sources. It is clear from the Code provisions and the official
comments that the intent is to facilitate market competition among
creditors by the heightened sensitivity of the consumer to cost of
credit.1'7
In the past, however, the consumer's concern was primarily
with the amount of credit he could obtain and the period and
amount of installment payments which were due. To what extent
segmentation of the market permitted or encouraged creditors to
create or foster this view is an interesting matter for speculation. If
disclosure does increase consumer awareness and sensitivity to the
cost of credit, what are the implications for the individual con-
sumer? Some consumers may be somewhat more circumspect in
selecting among credit sources and some may refrain from obtain-
ing credit. It is unlikely that the individual consumer will be able to
negotiate with the creditor about the rate of charge for a specific
obligation. Consumers may, however, benefit from an aggregate
increase in awareness about costs of credit. A general increase in
consumer concern about cost, or among specific classes of consumers,
will be a factor to be taken into consideration by creditors in estab-
lishing rate schedules or in circulating information about credit
costs. In the long run, consumer rate sensitivity may affect the gen-
eral cost of credit if it affects the demand for credit or if it indirectly
has an effect on the supply and availability for those who are willing
to make consumer credit extensions. There may also be some differ-
ential effects if creditors restrict extensions to particular classes
of consumers. Some indication of the impact of consumer pressure
on either the level or the differential structure of rates may become
evident if particular credit costs settle below the ceilings in the
Code.
10 UCCC §§ 2.502, 5.204.
17 See UCCC § 2.201, Comment 1.
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III. REGULATING CREDITOR ACTIVITY IN CREDIT
EXTENSIONS, COLLECTIONS, AND CONTRACT TERMS
Stimulation of creditor competition and availability of credit
sources will not, by itself, assure arm's length dealings between
the individual consumer and creditor. Whatever benefits flow from
increased competition in a mass market, they accrue to consumers
as a class and are realized by the individual consumer because he
is a member of that class, or of a subgroup within it. It is doubtful
that these market developments will result in melioration of con-
tract terms, other than lower credit costs, for the consumer-par-
ticularly terms relating to creditor rights and remedies. Indeed,
creditors pressed by competition to reduce rates or lower credit
standards are likely to strengthen their remedial position to mini-
mize losses presumed to follow relaxation of credit standards. Simi-
larly, in a highly competitive market the likelihood that some cred-
itors will resort to high pressure (and even misleading or fraudu-
lent) sales and collection techniques is increased. Moreover, no
amount of stimulation of creditor competition can deal effectively
with the problem of the unscrupulous creditor bent on, or specializ-
ing in, taking advantage of the individual consumer-particularly
the economically disadvantaged or unsophisticated consumer. For
these reasons, the Code cannot rely upon competition alone to pro-
tect the consumer in the market place and must address itself to:
(1) creditor behavior/in the solicitation and offering of credit, (2)
collection practices, and (3) terms of the formal contract.
Code restrictions on the conduct of the creditor in the solicita-
tion and offering of credit attempt to define how far the creditor
can go in inducing the consumer to undertake a particular obliga-
tion. They indicate when and how the creditor must inform the
consumer of the terms of the arrangement. Additionally, they give
some guidelines as to what limitations there are on what the cre-
ditor may tell the consumer. The prohibition against misleading
and false advertising embraces the traditional notion that there is
a point beyond which the creditor may not go in puffing his wares.' 8
Further definition is given to these terms in the Code, however, in
relation to credit costs. Advertising in which the creditor refers to
the amount of charge or installments is misleading if it also fails
to state the rate of charge in the manner specified in the Code.
Offering practices, which are not technically false or misleading
but take undue advantage of the consumer's situation, have in the
past been ignored in consumer credit regulation. The Code attempts
to deal, albeit cautiously, with this serious consumer problem. The
18 UCCC §§ 2.313, 3.312.
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Code permits the consumer to extricate himself from an arrange-
ment in three specific instances where undue creditor pressure often
occurs: (1) the home solicitation sale,:9 (2) the referral sale,20 and
(3) the credit extension involving the second mortgage lien.21 In
the referral sale, the creditor appeals to the natural cupidity of
human beings-the desire to get something for nothing-by promis-
ing the consumer a rebate for customer referrals. In most cases,
the rebate never materializes. Not only is the creditor aware of this
fact at the time the sales solicitation is made but he relies upon
it. In the case of the referral sale, it is the ploy itself that is regarded
as unfair. In the home solicitation case, it is situs of the sale that
is the controlling factor. It is often argued that rescision is appro-
priately limited to the home solicitation sale because there is a
special kind of pressure associated with the sales solicitation occur-
ring in the customer's home. The reasons for giving special treat-
ment to the home solicitation sale and not to high pressure tech-
niques in other contexts are, in our opinion, not convincing.
Aside from the specialized provisions noted above and the dis-
closure provisions already discussed, the only other provision spe-
cifically applicable to unfair solicitation practices is one empower-
ing the consumer credit administrator to bring an action to restrain
a creditor from "engaging in a course of ... fraudulent or uncon-
scionable conduct in inducing debtors to enter into consumer credit
[arrangements]."2 2 This provision benefits the prospective customer
but not the consumer who has already been taken in. The remedy
for the latter is found in a different section which adopts, almost
verbatim, the unconscionability provision of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code.2 Strictly construed, however, this remedy is not
available if the consumer is induced by unconscionable conduct
to enter the agreement if the terms of that agreement are not
unconscionable.
Extortionate collection practices are prohibited by the Code,
and any credit arrangement made with the threat or understanding
that the creditor will use such practices is unenforceable.24 The
administrator's power to obtain a restraining order for unconscion-
able conduct also applies to collection practices. 25 By and large,
however, restrictions on collection practices are implicit in many
of the limitations imposed on contract terms. For example, the
19 UCCC §§ 2.501 to 2.505.
20 UCCC § 2.411.
21 UCCC § 5.204.
2 UCCC § 6.111(1) (b).
2 Compare UCCC § 5.108 with UCC § 2-302.
24 UCCC § 5.107.
25 UCCC § 6.111.
AN ANALYSIS: UNIFORM- CONSUMER CREDIT CODE 739
elimination of the wage assignment and the retention of garnish-
ment coupled with the provision relating to discharge from employ-
ment because of garnishment are aimed more at minimizing harass-
ment tactics in collections than at restricting the creditor's security
interest in the debtor's future wages.
Whatever the process of exchange between the consumer and
the prospective creditor prior to the consummation of the arrange-
ment, the terms of the contract itself, other than the principal
amount, the method of repayment, and in some cases the collateral
required, are not the subject of negotiations or discussions by the
parties. And there is no reason to expect that they will become so.
The contract is a standard printed form containing appropriate
blank spaces. Neither the consumer nor the creditor's representa-
tive is qualified to negotiate about any of the printed contract terms
and, in the latter case, not authorized to do so. Although disclosure
emphasizing rates may affect costs, no amount of disclosure or
stimulation of creditor access to the market is likely to change the
pattern of contract negotiations for most other contract terms.
Code provisions limiting contract terms deal essentially with
three matters: (1) credit cost, (2) method of payment, and (3) cre-
ditors' remedies. The justification for developing a set of ceilings
for finance charges, rather than rate controls or a fixed set of rates,
is that the Code seeks to have rates determined in the market
by the forces of supply and demand. At the same time, these ceiling
rates set a limit beyond which the credit cost is regarded as unrea-
sonable under any circumstances. A whole series of provisions
relating to costs and terms of repayment are included. Although
they differ in some respects from existing legislation, they are, by
and large, modified versions of provisions appearing in many exist-
ing statutes. Matters covered include delinquency charges, deferral
charges, refinancing, consolidation, debtor's right to prepay in full,
refunds on prepayment, balloon payments, and insurance.26
With the exception of the above restrictions, most Code provi-
sions deal with contract terms relating to creditor remedies. This is
only natural as once the arrangement is consummated the primary
obligation rests with the consumer, namely, repayment. Confes-
sions of judgment are prohibited.&2 7 Attorneys' fees are limited.28
Although assignment of wages is prohibited, garnishment subse-
26 See UCCC §§ 2.201 to 2.210, 3.201 to 3.210, 3.508 to 3.511, 4.101 to 4.304.
27 UCCC §§ 2.415, 3.407.
28 The Code gives two alternatives: (1) A provision for payment by
consumer of attorney's fees is unenforceable. UCCC § 2.413, Alterna-
tive A. (2) The contract may provide for reasonable attorney's fees
up to 15% after default and referral to an attorney not a salaried
employee of the creditor (or, in the case of sales credit, his assignee).
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quent to judgment is not.29 In this case, however, maximums are
imposed on the amount that may be deducted for each pay period.
The deficiency judgment is eliminated where the original cash
price of the goods is less than one thousand dollars. 30 A seller's right
to take collateral is restricted to a security interest in the property
sold; or with respect to which services are provided or goods sold
for installation where the debt is at least one thousand dollars if
secured by land or three hundred dollars if secured by personal
property. In addition, the seller may obtain a security interest in
property sold by him previously if he has an existing security
interest in that property; or he may obtain a security interest in
the subject of the present sale as collateral for a prior sales obliga-
tion.3 ' These restrictions do not, however, apply to lenders. The
,nly restriction on collateral for lenders applies to an interest in
land where the debt is less than one thousand dollars. 32 Similar
treatment could have been afforded sellers and lenders-at least in
the case where a lender customarily, through direct loans, finances
sales for particular sellers. From the point of view of the consumer,
there is no functional difference.
What could be the most significant Code provision regulating
contract terms in the long run is the unconscionability provision
taken from the Uniform Commercial Code. A contract, or terms of
a contract, found by a court to be unconscionable is unenforceable
against the consumer.3 3 In addition, the administrator is authorized
to obtain a restraining order against any creditor making or collect-
ing unconscionable agreements.3 4 There are, however, significant
limitations imposed upon application of the concept by the drafters.
As already noted, only the administrative remedy is available for
unconscionable solicitation and collection practices. In addition,
even though it is conceivable that some acts or practices authorized
by the Code may, under certain circumstances, be unconscionable,
the drafters specifically state that a charge or practice expressly per-
mitted by the Code is not in itself unconscionable. Exactly how this
UCCC § 2.413, Alternative B. If alternative (2) is selected, the provi-
sion applicable to supervised loans is different: "With respect to a
supervised loan in which the principal is $1000 or less, the agreement
may not provide for the payment by the debtor of attorney's fees. A
provision in violation of this section is unenforceable." UCCC §
3.514(1).
29 UCCC §§ 2.401, 3.403, 5.104 to 5.106.
30 UCCC § 5.103.
31 UCCC §§ 2.406, 2.407. These provisions provide for allocation of pay-
ments.
32 UCCC § 3.510.
33 UCCC § 5.108.
34 UCCC § 6.111.
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qualification will be applied is not clear. It suggests, however, that
unconscionability is not an overriding concept, of which specific
Code prohibitions may be examples, but only applies to practices not
otherwise specifically dealt with in the Code. In addition, the ques-
tion of whether a particular contract or activity is unconscionable
is a question of law and not of fact. Although guidelines are given
as to the criteria for determining unconscionability for purposes of
applying the administrative remedy and for determining if a con-
tract term relating to insurance is unconscionable, the term receives
no further definition. It therefore remains for the courts to give
operational meaning to unconscionability. Although a strong sanc-
tion is imposed for unconscionable agreements on those creditors
who take the risk of engaging in marginal activity, the imprecision
of the concept itself to some extent limits its immediate value as a
deterrent to the unscrupulous creditor.
IV. IMPROVING THE CONSUMER'S REMEDIAL POSITION
In addition to imposing some limitations on creditors' remedies,
the Code has also attempted to improve the consumer's remedial
position. The most significant provision in this respect is that which
specifies that it is a violation of the Code to take a negotiable instru-
ment as evidence of a consumer debt.35 A transferee is a holder in
due course only if he takes a note executed in violation of the Code
and without notice of the fact that it is based on a consumer obliga-
tion. The drafters state, and in this respect they are probably cor-
rect, that a transferee cannpt argue that he has no notic when he
is dealing with a creditor regularly engaged in consumer credit
transactions. 86 The Code provision is a substantial improvement
over legislation in most states since it permits the consumer to
assert against most transferees claims and defenses arising out of
the original transaction. Unfortunately, the drafters dilute the im-
pact of this provision elsewhere-in one of the alternate provisions
relating to assertion of consumer claims against transferees, it is
stipulated that defenses may only be asserted against the assignee
if, within three months of notice of the assignment, the assignee
has received notice of claims arising before that time.3 Moreover, in
making the general provision relating to non-negotiability applic-
able only to sales credit obligations, the drafters overlook the func-
tionally similar situation where a lending institution extends credit
to a consumer for the purpose of paying for purchases made from
sellers who have an arrangement with the lending institution, such
as the bank credit card.
35 UCCC § 2.403.36 See UCCC § 2.403, Comment.
37 UCCC § 2.404, Alternative B.
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Other special remedies are available to the consumer for acts
in willful violation of the Code. He may recover specified multiples
of the finance charge for violation of the disclosure provisions, the
execution of a negotiable instrument, or violation of loan limits.
38
Supervised loans made by non-licensees are void.3 9 Time limitations
on assertion of claims by consumers do not apply when the claim
is asserted either as a defense or set off in a suit by the creditor.
40
Moreover, the debtor has a right to a refund of excess charges made,
and, if the excess charge is made willfully or the creditor refuses
on demand to make the refund, the creditor is liable to the con-
sumer for an amount equal to ten times the excess or the total
finance charge, whichever is greater 4 1 In these cases the burden of
proof is on the creditor to show that the violation was not willful.
The value to the individual consumer of improvement of his
remedial position may well be illusory if he does not have the
capability and resources to assert his claims. To this extent, the
deterrent effect of the Code prohibitions is also diminished. The
drafters cautiously attempt to deal with these difficulties. In the
case of excess charges, the Code encourages settlement by relieving
the creditor from liability if he refunds excess charges made, as long
as the violation is not willful. In the case of violation of disclosure
provisions, the consumer may collect costs and attorneys' fees where
he is successful in an action for the Code provided civil penalty.2
However, by and large, the consumer must bear the cost and risk
of asserting claims against the creditor. It may often be the case
that it is economically not feasible for the consumer to assert his
claims in court even when the creditor has instituted the pro-
ceedings.
The Code has authorized the state consumer credit administra-
tor to seek redress for certain violations. In addition to the right
to issue cease and desist orders and to obtain restraining orders
against further violations, the administrator may also bring an
action for redress on behalf of a group of consumers where the
violation is the making of excess charges.43 This provision has the
flavor of a class action, and assuming that the administrator is will-
ing to take action, deals in some respects with the economic prob-
lem that the individual consumer faces in pursuing his own indi-
vidual claim. But the administrator's power to bring a civil action
38 UCCC §§ 5.202, 5.203.
39 UCCC § 5.202.
40 UCCC § 5.205.
41 UCCC § 5.202.
42 UCCC § 5.203.
43 UCCC §§ 6.104, 6.108, 6.113.
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on behalf of a number of consumers is not extended beyond claims
relating to excess charges; nor is there any provision by which a
group of consumers can move the administrator to seek the civil
remedy even for excess charges. No class action is specifically
authorized for consumers either in respect to excess charges or any
other Code violations. Finally, the successful consumer in an action
by or against a creditor is not specifically allowed attorney's fees
and costs except in the disclosure case previously mentioned. Some
of the procedural devices noted above may well be available under
state laws. However, even in those cases, it would not have been
inappropriate for the Code to have restated the availability of such
rights-if only to clarify Code policy.
V. CONCLUSION
We often underestimate the extent to which the cost of consumer
credit, even today, is still affected by the usury laws and related
ideas about productive credit popular in the last century. Usury
laws, as is well known, prevented many of the established financial
intermediaries from making consumer loans in the last century.
The Russell Sage sponsored Uniform Small Loan Act, the Morris
Plan Industrial Banks and the Industrial Loan Laws, the Install-
ment Loan Laws (the enabling legislation for the commercial
banks), the credit union legislation, the rigid adherence to the
time-price doctrine by the courts, and the Retail Installment Sales
Acts have, in the last sixty years, exempted particular groups of
creditors from the usury laws. And these creditors developed meth-
ods of quotation such as the "add-on rate," the "discount rate," the
"simple interest rate," the use of a discount plus fee, and the dollar
amount for monthly payments, all of which tend to suppress the
finance charge and thus enable them to operate in spite of usury
laws and the "six percent myth." Nevertheless, in spite of these laws
and devices to get around the usury limits, many financial inter-
mediaries cannot, even today, easily or readily enter the install-
ment loan market, without enactment of a special statute. Hence
the need for a Uniform Consumer Credit Code to stimulate compe-
tition and also permit new lenders to enter this market. Those who
question the need to strengthen competition among existing credit
extenders, and the need to open up the market to new lenders
assume, implicitly, that the supply of consumer credit at the present
time is normal. They also assume that the legal fictions that have
developed in the last fifty years have offset and cancelled out the
effect of usury laws and the tradition of not extending consumer
credit. But this view overlooks the historical development of the
consumer credit industry. We should recall that the combination of
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usury laws coupled with an unwritten doctrine of productive
credits prevented the development of a market for consumer loans
at the turn of the century. In those days most of the consumer
loans were handled by loan sharks-hence the interest of the
Russell Sage Foundation in developing the Uniform Small Loan
Act. It is only in the last sixty years that finance companies, com-
mercial banks, and credit unions have been freed from the restric-
tions of usury laws and are ready, together with retailers, to engage
in this kind of business. Nevertheless, even today, thrift interme-
diaries (such as savings and loans and mutual savings banks), pen-
sion funds, life insurance companies, and other financial interme-
diaries cannot readily make consumer loans even if they should
wish to.44 Accordingly, those who wish to free the consumer credit
market from the shackles of outmoded usury laws, from the "six
percent myth," and from any lingering vestiges of the doctrine of
unproductive credit are not trying, arbitrarily, to bring in addi-
tional lenders and inflate the volume of credit in this market over
that which would occur naturally in a market of easier entry. They
are trying to remove some of the vestiges of restrictive usury laws
and primitive views of productive credit and interest rates.
The Code may be criticized for not going far enough in remov-
ing the legal fragmentation of cash loans and credit sales, the time-
price doctrine, and the continued segmentation of the consumer
credit market into open end, closed end, lender and vendor credit.
But it should at least be recognized that it has taken a few important
steps in the right direction of removing entry restrictions and facili-
tating competition, and removing many of the problems that are
associated with the usury laws and the doctrine of unproductive
credit.
By the same token, the Code can be criticized for not going far
enough in protecting the individual consumer against solicitation
and collection practices or insuring that the consumer can effec-
tively assert claims against creditors. Nevertheless, the Code again
reveals an innovative approach. At most it can be criticized for not
going far enough with its innovations. But taken in its entirety,
there is no question that the Code represents an advance over exist-
ing consumer credit regulation.
44 See FAND, note 4 supra.
